The securitization of citizenship in a ‘Segregated City’:A reflection on Rio’s Pacifying Police Units by Poets, Desiree
Aberystwyth University
The securitization of citizenship in a ‘Segregated City’
Poets, Desiree
Published in:
URBE -  Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana
DOI:
10.1590/2175-3369.007.002.SE03
Publication date:
2015
Citation for published version (APA):
Poets, D. (2015). The securitization of citizenship in a ‘Segregated City’: A reflection on Rio’s Pacifying Police
Units. URBE -  Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana, 7(2), 182-194. https://doi.org/10.1590/2175-
3369.007.002.SE03
Document License
CC BY
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Aberystwyth Research Portal (the Institutional Repository) are
retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the
legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Aberystwyth Research Portal for the purpose of private study or
research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Aberystwyth Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
tel: +44 1970 62 2400
email: is@aber.ac.uk
Download date: 03. Oct. 2019
DO
I: 
 1
0.
15
90
/2
17
5-
33
69
.0
07
.0
02
.SE
03
   
ISS
N 
21
75
-3
36
9
Lic
en
cia
do
 so
b u
ma
 Li
ce
nç
a C
re
at
ive
 Co
mm
on
s
urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), 2015 maio/ago., 7(2),  182-194 
The securitization of citizenship in a ‘Segregated 
City’: a reflection on Rio’s Pacifying Police Units
A securitização da cidadania em uma cidade ‘segregada’: uma reflexão 
sobre as Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora do Rio de Janeiro
Desiree Poets
Aberystwyth University, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom
DP is MScEcon, PhD Candidate, e-mail: dep9@aber.ac.uk
Abstract
The Pacification Police Units – UPPs – implemented in Rio de Janeiro since 2008 have as one of their stated 
goals the promotion of the integration between the pacified favelas and the ‘formal’ city, aiming to overcome 
the view of Rio as a ‘divided city’. Intending to problematize the reasoning behind this stated goal in order 
to question the UPPs’ very foundations, this article examines the political and sociospatial background in 
which they were introduced. The implementation and operation of the UPPs is outlined in the context of the 
militarization of Rio’s spaces, and especially of its urban poor regions, within an analysis of what assumptions 
about favelas and slum residents the UPPs imply. The UPPs are analyzed in dialogue with Giorgio Agamben’s 
work as a sovereign act of ‘drawing lines of distinction’ between lives worth living and politically worthless 
‘Others’. It becomes clear that they are guilty of articulating and reinforcing what Teresa Caldeira has named 
the ‘talk of crime’, a Manicheistic discourse through which Brazilians articulate and cope with their daily 
encounter with violence. The disjunctive nature of Brazil’s ‘inclusively inegalitarian’ democracy, as explored 
by James Holston, is emphasized. Brazil emerges as a post-dictatorial country, in which neoliberal reforms and democratic opening have simultaneously implied an increasingly authoritarian penal state that targets 
the urban marginalized as its ‘internal enemies’.
Keywords: UPPs. Public security policy. Brazilian democracy. Urban segregation.
Resumo
As Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora – UPPs – implementadas no Rio de Janeiro desde 2008 têm como um 
de seus objetivos a promoção da integração entre as favelas e a ‘cidade formal’, superando a segregação da 
cidade. Com o objetivo de problematizar o raciocínio por trás dessa meta, a fim de questionar os fundamentos 
das UPPs, o artigo explora o contexto político e socioespacial do Brasil e do Rio de Janeiro no qual foram 
introduzidas as UPPs. A implantação e operação das UPPs é colocada no contexto da militarização do espaço 
urbano, principalmente das suas regiões mais pobres, junto com uma análise dos preconceitos sobre favelas e 
seus moradores articulados pelas UPPs. As UPPs são entendidas em diálogo com a obra de Giorgio Agamben 
como um ato soberano de “traçar linhas de distinção” entre tipos de vidas que merecem ser vividas e ‘outras’ 
construídas como politicamente inúteis. Torna-se claro que as UPPs articulam e reforçam o que Teresa Caldeira 
chamou de “fala do crime”, um discurso maniqueísta através do qual a população brasileira expressa e lida 
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Since the re-democratization period that commenced 
in the mid-1970s and intensified in the 1980s, the 
social, political and spatial divisions within Rio de 
Janeiro have become perceived as increasingly acute. The city is known today for its rising number of favelas 
and its high crime and homicide rates. Repeated public security crises in the past decades have helped the 
consolidation of this image. For Rio’s citizens, the city sustains an environment of public insecurity commonly associated with social and economic inequality. The 
2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games provided an impetus for a transformation of this 
picture. In this context, the 2008 pacification of the 
Dona Marta favela in Botafogo marked the beginning of a new public policy approach. Developed by Public 
Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame under the 
government of Sérgio Cabral, the Pacifying Police Units 
of Rio’s favelas, or UPPs, at the end of 2014 add up 
to 38 units1. These include the well-known Cidade de 
Deus or City of God, Complexo do Alemão and Rocinha.
According to the UPPs official website (UPP, 2014, 
our translation), the pacifications have the following 
official goals, amongst others:[…] to resume territories once dominated by ostentatiously armed criminal groups and establish the democratic state based on the rule of law. […] To contribute to breaking the logic of 
“war” that exists in the state of Rio de Janeiro. 
To allow the entry or expansion of public services and the private sector, traditionally limited by the action of the parallel power of criminal groups; […] To contribute to a greater integration of these territories and their inhabitants into the city as whole, disabling the traditional view of 
‘divided city’ that characterizes Rio de Janeiro. Despite these ambitious plans, the UPPs occur 
within an existing state of affairs that absorbs and 
1  By January 2015, Complexo da Maré had been militarily occupied in preparation for the 39th UPP, but the UPP had as of yet not been installed.
limits them. More specifically, they arose from a context 
of widespread preconceptions about citizenship, criminality, marginality and favelas (Perlman, 2010) 
within a neoliberal framework that exchanges economic 
laissez-faire for an increasingly authoritarian “penal state”, 
a model exported by the United States and readily 
imported by Brazilian authorities (Wacquant, 2008).As such, it is the aim of this paper to show the 
inherent and external limitations to the UPPs’ stated goals, mainly through the contributions of Loïc 
Wacquant, Nilo Batista, Vera Malaguti Batista, Teresa 
Caldeira and Giorgio Agamben. Their works help us 
understand the historical construction of this ‘divided 
city’ and investigate whether the UPPs are apt to 
tackle the problem of segregation in Rio de Janeiro 
once we problematize the discursive and material 
construction of this perceived ‘division’ of the urban 
tissue. How was a military occupation justified, and under what circumstances did it become perceived as a legitimate solution to the problem of segregation 
and inequality in Rio de Janeiro? As we answer this 
we will see that the UPPs’ limits are present because they are part of rather than a challenge to the larger 
scheme of the criminalization and militarization of drugs within a logic of war since the military rule of 
1964-1985 (Batista, 1997) – the effects of which are 
still widely felt in Brazil.
Militarization continued in post-dictatorship Brazil as democratic opening and economic reforms were accompanied by growing state intervention in criminal 
matters within the aforementioned ‘neoliberal penal 
state’, backed by the mainstream media and with 
significant public support. The penal state works 
through the centuries-old criminalization of the poor 
– especially the black youth – concentrated in Brazil in the urban peripheries and favelas. Since the era of formal colonialism and slavery, they have been the main 
targets of criminal policies and police violence (Malaguti 
Batista, 2003). Today, they are over-represented in the 
country’s prisons and homicide rates. More recently, 
this is linked to what Teresa Caldeira (2000) has 
com seu encontro diário com a violência. A natureza disjuntiva da democracia “inclusiva e desigual” do Brasil, 
como explica James Holston, é enfatizada. O Brasil aparece como um país pós-ditatorial onde as reformas 
neoliberais e a abertura democrática causaram a paralela criação de um Estado penal autoritário que tem 
como alvo o subproletariado urbano.
Palavras-chave: UPPs. Política de segurança pública. Democracia brasileira. Segregação urbana.
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named the “talk of crime”, which dichotomizes between 
hard-working, morally upright, good Brazilians and evil, morally weak and savage criminals or potential criminals. The latter are considered unworthy of human 
rights or any form of legal protection within what James 
Holston has called Brazil’s ‘inclusively inegalitarian 
citizenship’ that only formally recognizes universal rights whilst substantially distributing rights through lines of privilege.These processes are also spatial. The rise of 
favelas, re-democratization and the perceived public insecurity in a country increasingly affected by high crime rates has led to processes of spatial segregation epitomised by the global phenomenon of gated 
communities and ‘fortified enclaves’, on the rise in 
Brazil since the 1970s. The discursive construction of the homogeneous spaces of such communities is mutually constitutive of the discursive construction of favelas as the spaces of crime, lawlessness, war and marginality. The UPPs then go a step further into 
enforcing the dichotomization between these two 
spaces – the ‘organized’ and ‘disorganized’ space, for 
instance – and into declaring the state of exception in favelas, which justifies the implementations of the UPPs. The state of exception legitimizes the suspension of democratic law, turning their inhabitants into what 
Giorgio Agamben (1995) has named the Homo Sacer. For him, the state of exception is a constitutive part of contemporary politics, rather than an anomaly of it.
On a similar note, Milton Santos (1979) has argued 
that underdeveloped cities in places such as Brazil are formed by two intimately linked and complementary 
‘parts’, the formal and informal economies, so that these spaces are not only discursively but also materially mutually constitutive. As such, the notion 
of Rio de Janeiro as a ‘divided city’ and the turning to favelas as the space that requires integration into 
the ‘formal city’ disregards the particular relationship 
between these two circuits, which he names ‘upper’ 
and ‘lower’. A break with this vision of Rio de Janeiro as a divided city would require a re-thinking of and rupture with the centuries-old repeated attempts to 
differentiate between kinds of citizens and segregate the spaces associated with them, and the resulting relationships between the ‘two cities’. It would also require a questioning of the different rights that apply to them, for favela residents and (potential) criminals are granted less democratic protection, 
instead of a military intervention into one of those spaces, the favelas.
The UPPs: paradigmatic break?The UPPs are installed in phases, from the gathering of intelligence, the invasion of the favela, the establishment of permanent UPP police stations in the favela’s territory to the co-operation with the 
Social UPP program – since August 2014 re-labeled 
Rio+Social. They supposedly operate within a model of community policing. In some cases, such as the 
pacification of Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da 
Maré, the armed forces were deployed in the stages of invasion and territorial occupation, staying in the favela for several months after occupation. In the former, but also in others such as Vila Cruzeiro, the occupation was televised as part of a large investment into assigning it legitimacy through widespread media attention 
to foster public support. Recently, this support has received a blow after repeated outbreaks of violence 
in pacified favelas as well as reports of human rights 
abuses by the pacifying police (O Dia, 2014b), most prominently in Rocinha and Complexo do Alemão. The UPPs were portrayed in the media as a radical, innovative break from previous public security policies that aimed to deal with immediate public security crises in favelas, after which the police would retreat. The UPPs, instead, take a supposedly communitarian approach and focus on the favelas’ social development.
However, the UPPs are not as paradigmatic a break as 
these accounts suppose. Not only inspired by the model applied to Medellín in Colombia (Jácomo, 2011; Conectas 
Human Rights, 2012), the UPPs come from an older 
shift, since the end of the 1970s, from a policy of favela removal to favela upgrading or urbanization programs2.  
2  The decrease in favela removals was not absolute. More 
recently, in the context of the series of sports mega events 
held in Rio and, in the case of the World Cup, throughout 
Brazil – beginning with the Pan American Games in 2007 
– removals have re-entered public debate. The defense of removals combines concerns over violence, environmental conservation and the need to prepare the city for the games. The case of the community Vila Autódromo, located in Barra 
da Tijuca and adjacent to the Olympic Park, is emblematic. Another removed community was the favela do Metrô, locat-
ed right next to the Maracanã stadium. For more information on the continuities and discontinuities in the practices and 
justifications for removals in dictatorship and post-dictator-
ship Brazil, see Brum (2013).
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One such program was Favela-Bairro, implemented in 1993 in accordance with the Plano Diretor da Cidade 
do Rio de Janeiro as foreseen in the 1988 Constitution 
(Brum, 2013). The community policing model is also not a complete innovation, having been tried out 
in Copacabana in the 1990s (Albernaz et al., 2007). 
Besides having drawn inspiration from other models of policing, one of the most important continuities of the UPP is its embeddedness within a larger process of growing state intervention in the matter of public 
security. Brazil’s current form of state intervention has been on the rise since the military dictatorship as economic reforms towards neoliberalism meant increasing inequalities within the country and the 
criminalization and militarization of the marginalized, urban poor and the spaces associated with them. The latter are targeted as the loci of crime and the origin of the recurring public security crises3 as well as high crime rates often associated with the international 
network of drug and weapons trafficking that affects 
the country since re-democratization (Wacquant, 2008; 
Malaguti Batista, 2003, 2010, 2011; Batista, 1997).The war-like invasion of favelas is legitimized 
through this gradual establishment of the ‘neoliberal 
penal state’ (Wacquant, 2008), a historical process initiated under the military dictatorship during the Cold 
War linked to the consolidation of what Nilo Batista 
(1997) has called the “military model of criminal policy.” 
Drugs came to symbolize Communist subversion, and 
therefore the ‘internal enemy’ to the “moral bases of 
Christian civilization” (Batista, 1997, p. 12). This has 
led to the creation of a ‘criminal policy with spilling 
of blood’, as he names it, as the potential economic 
profits of war with an external enemy – the Soviet 
block – were redirected towards the international 
‘organized crime’ that also originates within state 
borders. In Brazil more specifically, the favela and its 
mostly black residents became the nation’s internal enemy, so that we have today a de facto “dictatorship 
over the poor” (Wacquant, 2008, p. 62). Democratic institutions fail that segment of society, whose rights 
are not protected in the judicial or executive systems. 
3  Important here were, just to name a few examples, the 1993 Candelária Church massacre by the military police 
of eight sleeping homeless children and the bus 174 case, which was televised live and in which a former street child and survivor of the Candelária massacre hijacked bus 174, took its passengers hostage and was killed on the way to the police station.
These processes are not exclusive to Brazil, as other 
metropolises experience their own patterns of inequality 
(Mitchell, 2003). The military invasion and occupation of favelas, with the acceptance of its ‘collateral effects’ 
that in practice implies a death penalty for the nation’s 
enemies – the drug traffickers, factions or quadrilhas – 
is part of these historical exclusionary processes, in no way implying a break from them.
The ‘penal state’ relies on the reproduction of a specific discourse on crime that relies on propaganda, described 
by Teresa Caldeira (2000) as the “talk of crime”. Within 
this, the media exercises a central and legitimizing role. This role became evident in the live transmission and 
public judgment or “executivization” (Batista, 2002, 
our translation) of Bus 174’s hijacker in 2002, for instance. The historical construction of the internal 
enemy as the poor, black and (potential) criminal can be traced back to the fears of slave uprisings 
(Malaguti Batista, 2003). The colonial relationship has left a socio-economic order that continues to 
identify the ‘black element’ as a possible insurgent, 
as a threat to order and ‘peace’ (Misse, 1999, 2010). 
Malaguti Batista provides a genealogy of the ‘fear 
of the (black) Other’, which is today a widespread 
culture of fear that legitimizes the historical control 
of those Others and the spaces associated with them 
for the sake of ‘purity’ within hygienist discourses 
that are constantly recycled. Brazil’s internal ‘Others’ 
are rooted in the country’s colonial history, which 
naturalized a global racial order that dichotomizes between humans and non-humans and furthered the development of capitalist relations of production 
(Mignolo, 2011; Mignolo & Escobar, 2010; Quijano, 
2000, 2007; Maldonado-Torres, 2010). They were, 
at first, ‘savage’ indigenous peoples, former slaves 
and international immigrants, but since the 1970s 
they have become these groups’ descendants and national migrants from poorer regions, especially the 
nordestinos of the Northeast, as well as those linked 
to ‘organized crime’.The economic possibilities opened up by the UPPs 
play a central role here, for the pacification of favelas 
enables profit-making for a number of businesses. More 
specifically, the UPPs have the – whether intended or 
unintended – outcome of bringing favela residents 
more firmly into the neoliberal market economy. They 
guarantee profits for the private sector through the 
installation of banks and the regularization of services 
such as cable TV and electricity in the communities. 
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The implementation of the UPPs also aims to portray 
the image of Brazil as ‘safe for investment’ by foreign 
investors for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic 
Games, since the disorderly poor and the drug traffickers 
are ‘under control’ (Malaguti Batista, 2011, p. 105). This short-sighted focus on the upcoming mega-events becomes even clearer when we consider that the UPPs 
were implemented first in the favelas of the most 
privileged areas, the city’s Zona Sul – where tourists 
are concentrated – whilst other favelas, such as Vila 
Autódromo and favela do Metrô were targeted for 
removal (Brum, 2013). It would not be sustainable and it is not the goal of the Secretariat of Security to 
occupy all of Rio’s favelas, so that one is left with the impression that one of the unstated intentions was to secure strategically important spaces for the capitalist 
profit-making of the upcoming mega-events, and 
generally to enable profits for the city’s big businesses.
Returning to the previous point, this symbolic and 
material distancing between different types of citizens 
is part of what James Holston (2008) has named 
Brazil’s ‘inclusively inegalitarian’ or ‘difference-specific’ 
citizenship. James Holston (2008) explains that whilst 
Brazil’s history of democracy since the 19th century is one of universal formal membership in the nation-state, the substantive distribution of rights, as he puts it, takes the form of a “gradation of rights, in which most 
rights are available only to particular kinds of citizens 
and exercised as the privilege of particular social 
categories” (Holston, 2008, p. 7). Social differences serve the purpose of legally distributing inequality. 
These social dynamics are in turn both expressed in 
and shaped by the city’s spaces. There is a sociospatial dialectic, of which favelas are a part, which forms the background to the implementation of the UPPs in 
2008. Democracy, citizenship and space are intimately 
linked, articulating matters of exclusion and inclusion through categories such as race, gender and class.
Within this setting of public insecurity and a culture of fear, the public is accepting and even supportive of 
‘more state’ in matters of public security and crime 
(Caldeira, 2000; Batista, 1997; Wacquant, 2008). In the private sphere and with this perceived lack of security 
and state control in mind, the Brazilian middle and upper classes have allocated growing investments 
to private security and gated communities. Other effects include an increasing tolerance for human rights abuses, public support for vigilante groups, and 
justifications for the legalization of the death penalty, 
already practiced de facto on the urban, black poor 
(Caldeira, 2000). As one example of this, in 2014, 
mainly in the month of February, Brazil experienced 
a relatively short-lived yet significant phenomenon: the emergence of justiceiros, or ‘avengers’. These were self-proclaimed groups who took the matter of 
‘justice’ in the streets into their own hands.
In one case in the neighborhood of Flamengo in Rio 
de Janeiro’s privileged South Zone, a group of around 
14 youngsters assaulted a 15-year old boy, stripped 
him naked and tied him to a lamppost (O Dia, 2014a). They accused him of repeated robberies in Flamengo. A survey by Datafolha in that same month showed a 79% disapproval for the justiceiros by the general 
public. Nevertheless, richer, more educated and white 
Brazilians were significantly more in favor of their 
actions (Folha de São Paulo, 2014): 24% of whites, for instance, approved of the justiceiros, as compared 
to 12% of blacks. The accused criminal was a black boy of low socio-economic status, and the justiceiros were white and middle-class. This phenomenon shows the race and class privilege under which 
Brazilian democracy functions. It carries authoritarian 
conceptions of public order (Caldeira, 2000) that advocate the eradication of thieves to eliminate the 
‘impurity’ or ‘immorality’ of the national character 
(Romero, 1967) in a country with long-standing 
antidemocratic traditions (Schwartzman, 2007).
Order, progress and undemocratic 
practices in undemocratic spaces
Parallel to an increased professionalization of 
the criminal networks since the 1970s and 80s, the 
growth of cocaine consumption and trafficking, and 
the discursive construction of drugs as the nation’s 
internal enemy (Malaguti Batista, 2006), Brazil also 
experienced a rise in segregationist urban planning. It is not argued here that security concerns are the only reason for the rise in this phenomenon, which can 
include convenience or lack of alternatives (Roming, 
2005). Nevertheless, the combination of an increase in security concerns and segregationist urban planning 
in Brazil is not accidental and shows a specific relationship between these two mutually enforcing 
developments. Neighborhoods like Barra da Tijuca 
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in Rio4 or Alphaville in São Paulo are illustrative of 
this, exhibiting highly technologically surveilled gated 
communities and malls. These “fortified enclaves” 
(Caldeira, 2000, p. 258) change the way that public space functions and attempt to mark a clear separation from the rest of the city, reinforcing the accepted, 
exclusionary social norms (Monahan, 2010, p. 81). A number of authors have interpreted such enclaves as a reaction to instability and the unsettling of social 
borders not only in Brazil but also the United States 
and Argentina (Caldeira, 1996; Monahan, 2010; 
Malaguti Batista, 2003).These transformations have been felt by the urban poor, who, in lack of alternatives for leisure activities, turn to the consumerist spaces of shopping malls 
for their free-time activities. However, these classes are not welcome there, as the rise of rolezinhos – or 
‘casual, small walks’ – has showed (Al Jazeera, 2014). 
Rolezinhos took place at the end of 2013 and start 
of 2014. They were simply gatherings of hundreds and sometimes thousands of young people from the peripheries in several malls throughout cities 
such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The rolezinhos, 
organized through social media, received extensive media attention, and were understood by some as a request for social inclusion, greater public investment in leisure and cultural activities for the poorer youth as well as mere opportunities for recreational outings5. 
However, it was maybe the reactions that they caused that clearly showed their political dimensions.
4  As the 1970s advanced, the demand for available lands for the real estate market was no longer concentrated in the 
Zona Sul, where favela removals were mostly concentrated until then. The Plano Lúcio Costa of real estate development 
and urbanization in the area of the then scarcely inhabited 
Baixada do Jacarepaguá, where Barra is located, would come as a solution. As the area was urbanised, favela removals in-
creased there as well (Brum, 2013).
5  In fact, the first rolezinho was explicitly political and took 
place in 2000, in the Rio Sul mall in Rio’s upper-middle class neighbourhood Botafogo. That year, members of the home-
less movement decided to go for a ‘walkabout’ in Rio Sul to 
protest against their exclusion. In the documentary that reg-
istered this protest (“Hiato”) we can see how the reactions to that group are strikingly similar to the ones afforded to the recent wave of rolezinhos, even though the latter were not 
always organized with explicitly political motivations. Stores 
refused to serve the homeless, perplexed at their presence, closing stores and calling the police.
Store owners and mall administrators reacted 
adversely – some malls were even granted injunctions against the rolezinhos. The rolezinhos were criminalized by the police and mainstream media for instilling disorder, insecurity and chaos. Mall and store managers showed their fear of a crowd of young, low-income 
Afro-Brazilians who gathered with the intention of having fun but who were perceived as potentially dangerous. The fear of disorder, chaos, crime and violence that underlies the logic of the creation of spaces of forced homogeneity, predictability, respectability 
and exclusivity such as malls became clear. As a 
phenomenon of mixed political and recreational 
motivations, these young Brazilians made evident the social segregation and culture of fear that underlies the sociability of shopping malls, where they are not welcome. Their simple act of association in malls was 
also a claim to citizenship, as explained by Malaguti 
Batista (2006, p. 254, our translation):A certain discourse on crime has to be repeated 
ad infinitum and ad nauseum to be fundamental to the management of the poor, those who are 
not to frequent the mall, the temple of citizenship 
consumption. Who said that our boys dying or 
killing for a Nike cap are not fighting for the 
citizenship offered by this moment of capitalism?
As already discussed in the notion of ‘inclusively 
inegalitarian’ citizenship, purchasing power – class 
– and citizenship are intertwined and confused in a 
society such as Brazil, where privilege still determines 
one’s access to rights and citizenship, and the poor 
are repeatedly marginalized and militarized. The rise of gated communities as direct opposites of favelas 
in the search for homogeneous, ‘secure’ spaces is an inherently political process that articulates the current state of democracy in the country, making clear who is being left out from its capitalist consumerist 
citizenship.As opposed to the more recent character of 
‘fortified enclaves’, cortiços and later favelas had been on the rise since the end of the 19th century as 
Brazil transitioned from a slavery-based to a capitalist 
economy (Silva, 2006). Their emergence was closely linked to social, political, cultural, economic and 
spatial transformations that occurred in Brazil in 
the second half of the 19th and first half of the 20th century. Among them, one could name as the most important the fall of the Empire and proclamation 
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of the Republic; the substitution of slave with paid 
labor (Silva, 2006); the consolidation of capitalism as well as the development of the secondary and 
tertiary sectors of the economy. Rio further underwent 
significant urbanization and demographic growth 
due to first international (Silva, 2006) but since the 
1930s especially national immigration (Perlman, 
1976), the former subsidized by the state in order to attract desirable, mostly European and white paid 
labor (Santos, 2002). With the installation of public services, such as of transport and sanitation, the 
resulting accelerated urbanization led to a housing 
crisis. Tenements (cortiços), at first located mostly in 
the city centre, became a profitable business and spread with the growth of the demand for cheap housing.
The First Republic (1889-1930) was thus a period 
of modernization, of the positivist principles of ‘order 
and progress’, and its symbol – Rio – should abide by European urban planning principles, inspired in the 
image of Paris. With the establishment of capitalism 
and the rise of biopolitics (Foucault, 2004), hygiene and surveillance, as well as the circulation of people and goods in the city became a growing concern. 
Foucault explains biopolitical power as the sovereign 
‘right to make live and let die’ (Foucault, 2003, p. 241), or a life-positive sovereignty that gradually developed between the 17th and 19th centuries. It functions through the creation of governmentality dispositifs 
and techniques that focus on the population’s body 
and their respective ‘utilities’ (Foucault, 2004). In 
this context, medicine becomes a method of social control. It is here that Foucault links the state to 
racism (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). In post-independence 
Brazil, this link took the form, for example, of an 
over-emphasis on the country’s racial ‘quality’ in 
nation-making efforts (Schwarcz, 1993). Meanwhile, 
in Rio de Janeiro’s peripheries, the state attempted to 
control the slave population and the (also sanitary) 
‘problems’ associated with black bodies (Malaguti 
Batista, 2003, p. 157). As such, Brazil engaged in 
nation-wide and regionally specific attempts to ‘purify 
the national race’.
In Rio, the state soon diagnosed a positive relationship between the increase in cortiços and insalubrity as urban space became perceived as the “most dangerous environment for the population” and 
as a “medicalizable object” (Foucault, 2000a, p. 99). 
Rio’s periodical epidemics of cholera, smallpox and yellow fever were quickly attributed to cortiços and 
their residents. The city’s modernization plans of 
the included new, open avenues – more prone to 
circulation and ventilation – which were to substitute 
the city centre’s narrow and overcrowded streets. 
Cortiços – the largest and most famous one being 
Cabeça-de-Porco in the city centre – were then doomed to disappear, although very few can still be 
found in neighborhoods like Botafogo and the city 
centre (Vaz, 1994; Santos, 2012; Xavier & Magalhães, 
2003). This period became known as the ‘bota-abaixo’ 
(knock it down) of the then mayor Pereira Passos. 
Unable to afford the alternative ‘hygienic housing’, 
such as the workers’ villages – whose construction 
was subsidized by the state – favelas emerged as a housing solution for the urban poor.
Having become officially recognized only around 
the 1940s, the beginning of the history of favelas is 
relatively unknown. However, it is often attributed to soldiers who, returning from the War of Canudos 
(1896-1897) (Levine, 1992)6, temporarily settled on Morro da Providência next to former slavers and informal workers who had already begun settling there 
(Perlman, 2010). The soldiers had been promised better housing, but then remained there when this 
promise was never kept. The growth of this first 
favela is also attributed to the removal of the cortiço 
Cabeça-de-Porco, whose residents, it is believed, built their shanties on that morro. Today, according 
to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistic’s 
2010 census (IBGE), over two million people in Rio, 
or 14.4% of the population, live in favelas. Within 
the context of repeated attempts at their elimination and displacement, its residents have been forced to apply their creativity to come up with strategies of 
survival. We see such strategies in the informal sector 
of the economy, the ‘camelôs’ and ‘piracy’ markets. 
In this context, Milton Santos (1979) stresses the 
co-dependent and intimate links between the ‘formal’ 
and ‘informal’ economies of underdeveloped cities, 
showing how the ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ circuits of the economy are always already integrated.
6  The war took place in the Northeastern state of Bahia, where thousands of poor settlers had created an autono-mous community of religious character. These included freed slaves, indigenous peoples and impoverished farmers and 
workers. After three military attacks by the Republican forc-
es, the fourth military expedition into Canudos entered the 
national history as a full-blown massacre of the settlement’s 
population, including women and children (Levine, 1992).
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What emerges is a picture of a city made up of ‘two 
sides of the same coin’, the formal and informal city, 
the ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ spaces, the ‘exceptional’ and 
‘normalized’ neighborhoods – the latter explored in more detail below. These are historically constructed through each other not only discursively but also 
materially. Nevertheless, we observe centuries-old attempts to control the physical and social place 
of the nation’s ‘Others’ within undemocratic and segregationist notions of a desirable nation and city. Since the military dictatorship, this has been an increasingly televised military endeavor as neoliberal reforms have relegated the urban poor more and more 
to the socioeconomic fringes of society. Rio faces a historical problem of inequality beyond material 
wealth and with complex links with crime. Rio’s symbolic segregation has important implications for public security policies for it not only inhibits social mobility, but, as Peirce puts it, “distorts the effect of deterrence measures, leaving the poorest sectors more vulnerable to becoming both the victims and 
perpetrators of crime” (Peirce, 2008, p. 90).
The militarization of favelas in 
the state of exception
Within this context of attempts at solidifying 
sociospatial segregation and since the 1980s, when 
favela drug factions took on their current form, the 
city has been increasingly securitized and militarized 
under a discourse of exceptionalism and an ‘urban war’ 
logic. Brazil’s authoritarian tradition has stimulated 
police institutions to maintain ‘order’ no matter what 
that implies, normalizing human rights abuses that are repeatedly reported. The military police, a product of the dictatorship, is the main institution responsible 
for patrolling Rio’s streets (Caldeira, 2000, p. 146). It is also deployed within the UPPs. Its behavior 
and culture is highly militarized, with policemen encouraged, as previously stated, to view themselves 
as ‘soldier warriors’ facing an internal enemy – the 
drug traffickers (Poncioni, 2005, p. 599). After Brazil became successfully involved in the United Nations 
Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Brazilian authorities made the decision to apply to their own 
‘humanitarian crisis’ what had been learned there, taking inspiration from the security policy model 
adopted in Medellín (Jácomo, 2011; Conectas Human 
Rights, 2012).
The UPPs’ main concern however – not surprisingly 
due to the operation’s militarized nature – is with 
territorial occupation rather than social development 
(Fleury, 2012, p. 213) or the dismantling of the 
‘geographies of inequality’ (Malaguti Batista, 2011, p. 106). The UPPs are an imposed policy that represents favelas 
as spaces ‘of lack’ – lacking sanitation, education, 
security, order etc. – as ‘war zones’ and as the loci of 
crime. The discourse in the media – which showed 
wide support and exaggerated optimism for the UPPs 
(Palermo, 2011) – was one constructed around the 
dichotomous confrontation between the ‘police warrior, 
defender of freedom’ and the ‘evil illegitimate criminal 
oppressors’. This discourse continued the logic that 
perceives drugs and drug traffickers as the nation’s internal enemy and furthered the Manicheism of the 
‘talk of crime’.
Hence, we can observe in the UPPs a discourse 
of crisis and exceptionalism. The justification of the 
police’s right to militarily occupy those spaces and 
to incur the possibility of ‘collateral effects’ is framed through the establishment of a state of exception in 
them. In Agamben’s concern with sovereign power 
under the expansion of the military apparatus especially in regards to the US response to 9/11 in its 
‘War on Terror’, this state of exception is a paradigm 
in contemporary politics (Agamben, 2005). He is therefore also deeply preoccupied with the problems of the democratic rule of law and its future prospects 
within an international context of the normalization of war. Agamben understands sovereign power as the right to decide on the state of exception – to call it into 
being – and to decide who is included in or excluded 
from the polis (Tagme, 2009, p. 412), or, as another scholar has put it, “which types of life are worth living” 
(Vaughan-Williams, 2009, p. 23).The sovereign act thus differentiates between 
politically valuable life (bios) and bare life (zoe) 
(Agamben 1995). The latter takes the form of the 
Homo Sacer, who is banned from the polis in a zone of indistinction between natural and political life and 
therefore can be killed but not sacrificed. The ‘camp’ 
is the quintessential expression of his theory, not as 
something relegated to the past but, as Agamben (1995, p. 
166) writes, as the “hidden matrix […] of the political space in which we are still living.” Spaces such as the camp are therefore an intrinsic part of modern politics, 
so that the exception becomes the rule. Torture and 
execution of the Homo Sacer are today normalized in 
global politics, which Wacquant and Batista have also 
argued more specifically within the Brazilian context. 
As the space where natural life and politically qualified 
life intertwine in a mutual inclusion and exclusion, the 
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Homo Sacer is, to borrow the words of Jenny Edkins, the “subjectivity or personhood produced by and 
captured in sovereign power” (Edkins, 2007, p. 75). 
In this particular relationship of inclusive exclusion, she understands bare life not simply as the absence of 
political value but the personification or living aspect of the taking away of political life.
The objectified subject of the ‘talk of crime’ is such a personhood. The virtual defense of a death penalty for and inhuman treatment of criminals and favela residents is rendered unproblematic, as was seen, through 
this inclusive exclusion. The sovereign act is thus not arbitrary or based on individual will; it is historically 
embedded in cultural practices and discourses (Tagme, 
2009), or what Foucault has named the “regime of 
truth” (Foucault, 2000b). In Brazil, this takes the form 
of the country’s ‘inclusively inegalitarian’ citizenship, 
one expression of which is the ‘talk of crime’ within the 
‘neoliberal penal state’. The treatment of favelas as war-
like spaces (Azevedo, 2014), and the public’s tolerance 
for ‘collateral effects’ show favelas as such a zone of indistinction, where political life is taken away and the 
Homo Sacer can be killed. Against the background of the history of the emergence of favelas and the repeated 
criminalization of its residents as part of a continuity 
of the colonial social order (Malaguti Batista, 2003), 
we can understand the complex historical roots of the current public security UPP model.
The sovereign act is thus embedded in the radicalized 
social order that continues to define insiders and outsiders, as well as those who are in-between as 
unrecognized or secondary citizens. As Agamben 
explains, this specific subjectivity is also tied to a 
specific space. In his works, he explores the Nazi 
concentration camp, but Brazil’s favelas too are such a liminal space. This point is also voiced by Malaguti 
Batista (2011, p. 116, our translation), who defended 
that Agamben’s state of exception is highly applicable 
to the pacified favelas as…[…]control in the open, in that perspective of 
Agamben’s state of exception. The idea of the 
‘camp’, the area of complete penal control of the daily lives of its residents, who are now in 
all aspects under the police’s direct tutelage 
[tutelados]. Taking the pacification of Alemão 
as a symbolic act of a city project, Rio’s media 
has cunningly invested in the ‘policization’ 
[policização] of life until the last detail, having 
the BOPE as the great helmsman.
It becomes evident that such differentiation between worthy and unworthy lives does not work towards integration or democracy. The UPPs leave the lines that divide the city unchanged in their content, 
even reinforcing the city’s symbolic segregation 
(Fleury, 2012). They make the drug factions, the criminals and the spaces associated with them hyper-visible, instead of tackling the sociability patterns and 
‘Othering’ processes that take place between the city’s spaces and their respective residents. Criminals and potential criminals continue to be seen as internal enemies, the Homo Sacer, declared unprotected by the law. The case of the worker Amarildo who was tortured and murdered by UPP policemen for being 
suspected of criminal activities (BBC News, 2013) 
serves here as an example of how this distinction is easily blurred, making it the responsibility of the 
(potential) Homo Sacer to prove himself as a worthy 
citizen, an ‘honest worker’ (trabalhador honesto). The lines remain in place because sovereign power, as Agamben teaches us, always works through drawing lines, so that even when it is possible to shift those lines, it seems impossible to get rid of them completely.The military and social phases of the UPPs try to sequentially cover crime deterrence and prevention through military occupation and later poverty relief 
within a discourse of ‘development’, the latter under the 
Social UPP (InSightCrime, 2014; Rio On Watch, 2011; 
Rio Mais Social, 2015)7. Military action and economic relief would on their own nevertheless not foster the type of coming together that would genuinely and 
7  Understood as complementary to the military phases of 
pacification, the Social UPPs promised to work with the com-munities in their aim to increase public and private services in favelas, such as health provisions and trash collection but also leisure activities and cultural projects. The Social UPPs 
have been widely criticized for several reasons, such as the lack of equal dialogue in the design and implementation of 
its policies (Rio On Watch, 2011). It was described by one 
scholar as a ‘decoration’ of the military UPP (InSightCrime, 
2014). Under these attacks, the Social UPP was re-launched 
in August 2014 as Rio Mais Social (“More Social Rio”) under the coordination of Instituto Pereira Passos in an attempt to distance it from the public policies concerning security. As 
of the end of 2014, it is implemented in 30 communities. 
However, when we look at the official website (Rio+Social 
Website), the close links between the military UPP and 
Rio+Social become immediately obvious. Its stated goals 
are namely to help consolidate the pacification process and 
promote citizenship; promote the favelas’ urban social and economic development and foster the integration of “these areas” into the city. Its effects remain to be seen.
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organically break down the existing divisions. That 
is because, firstly, explanations of why people resort to crime and violence that focus only on economic 
circumstances do not suffice. As has become clear, symbolic and discursive practices matter as well. Secondly, as previously discussed, there is a large state military and also private economic apparatus 
interested in maintaining the marginalized poor as 
the nation’s internal enemies. Thirdly, the UPPs do not 
look at the complex illegal crime networks that cross 
licit and illicit activities, including but not exclusively 
made up of non-state actors or drug traffickers 
(Peirce, 2008). These networks, furthermore, do not only take place in favelas. Finally, the securitization of 
an issue leads to its firmer imprisonment within the already accepted social form, removing it from “public 
debate and decision” (Edkins & Pin-Fat, 1999, p. 11). 
Securitization de-politicizes the issue, restricting the opportunities for alternatives to be imagined, let alone 
pursued. Securitizing and militarizing favelas blurs the lines between victims and perpetrators, for it 
emerges out of an ‘Othering’ discourse that maintains the status quo despite material changes.
Conclusion
If we recall the UPPs’ aims, they were to reintegrate 
favelas into the formal city, to establish peace and 
the democratic rule of law, to promote citizenship, 
and to break Rio’s ‘divided city’ and ‘war logic’. As seen, these goals require tackling both the discursive 
and material dimensions of public security. However, 
the UPPs do not question Brazil’s ‘inclusively 
inegalitarian’ citizenship, rooted in its colonial past and post-colonial development. Instead, the UPPs in 
many ways reinforce the ‘talk of crime’, maintaining the criminal as the Homo Sacer under the neoliberal 
penal state. The UPPs securitize citizenship and 
thereby confine it even further in its accepted social form. These are necessary elements of the 
legitimization and justification of such a military 
invasion and occupation with likely ‘collateral 
effects’. In post-dictatorship Brazil and for the UPPs, the media and public opinion hold an important 
role in the criminalization of the urban poor as the 
state’s ‘internal enemies’. As a military occupation 
of the spaces associated with those ‘enemies’, the UPPs do little to break the logic of war and image of 
Rio as a ‘divided city’. The militarization of favelas 
normalizes the state of exception and, at best, creates a negative peace, as recurring news on human rights abuses and violent outbreaks in UPP favelas remind 
us (O Dia, 2014b).The implementation of the UPPs also works to force favela residents into the neoliberal market by 
enabling private investments and the formalization 
of services in the pacified communities. This is especially the case in its last stage, the Social UPP/
Rio+Social. As we recognize this final stage as an 
extension of the military UPP, pacification has the 
effect of militarizing social development, which is approached with a heavy focus on bringing the market and therewith consumption into the favela 
rather than substantial rights. They make Brazil 
seem ‘safe for foreign investment’ in the capitalist 
endeavors of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 
Olympic Games. Rio+Social, however, has the potential to open up opportunities for bottom-up projects by civil society, and with them the potential 
to question the prevalent discourse. Nevertheless, 
calling such problems ‘social’ is itself a discursive strategy employed by liberal popular and scholarly 
discourse alike. Relegating the problems in favelas 
to the ‘social’ realm takes them away from notions 
of the political and so de-problematize them.
However, the UPPs are not an un-political, technical or managerial project. They are inherently political and disjunctive. They speak to issues that concern our very understanding of the political, articulating the foundations of the modern nation-state: the notion 
of sovereign power and the exercise of democracy. 
Within this, Rio is only an illustrative example. Such sovereignty as brought forward by Agamben is found, 
with its own cultural and historical specificities, wherever the modern nation-state has emerged. 
We see it operate, for example, in refugee camps or 
for asylum seekers. Having said this, Brazil emerges 
not as a ‘failed state’, but as undergoing a specific 
experience of ‘modernity’. The portrayal of Brazil as a post-dictatorial country should not be understood 
to imply that ‘Brazil is not democratic yet’, and that somehow it will undergo a linear progress towards equality and inclusion. Instead, democratic and 
authoritarian rule can not only coexist, but, as Agamben shows us, are mutually constitutive and 
reinforcing. As such, Brazil takes part in broader, 
global developments towards militarization and also 
urban segregation (Monahan, 2010, p. 83).
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Top-down approaches like the UPPs rarely 
get to the bottom of the problem. To re-politicize this matter would require an interruption of the 
prevalent discourse. Brazil requires a re-thinking 
not only of the executive and judicial power, but also of its sociability patterns. This needs to be done with historical awareness. The UPPs will therefore probably not offer us a magic solution to public security issues. At the same time, it may be 
true that it is now almost impossible to imagine Rio 
without them. We must try and direct these recent movements as they happen. For favelados, pacification has the potential to create and has created many 
opportunities – something that remained outside 
the scope of this article to expand on, and that we 
are still to observe in its full long-term effects – but this process has to involve the whole city. It is the relationship between spaces that has to be 
problematized, not the isolated dynamics within one space only, the favelas. As one Brazilian once said: “As long as the poor are killing each other, the social and political balance stays the same” 
(Spyer, 1999, p. 278). Focusing on the policemen for blame and favela residents for potential criminals or victims, both usually belonging to the lowest classes 
in Rio de Janeiro, means overlooking the relevance 
of the complex dynamics that cross several of Rio’s spaces, racial groups and classes, which both affect and are affected by the current situation.
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